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Abstract—In this work we study the problem of misbehavior
detection in wireless networks. A commonly adopted approach
is to utilize the broadcasting nature of the wireless medium and
have nodes monitor their neighborhood. We call such nodes
the Watchdogs. In this paper, we first show that even if a
watchdog can overhear all packet transmissions of a flow, any
linear operation of the overheard packets can not eliminate miss-
detection and is inefficient in terms of bandwidth. We propose
a lightweigh misbehavior detection scheme which integrates the
idea of watchdogs and error detection coding. We show that
even if the watchdog can only observe a fraction of packets, by
choosing the encoder properly, an attacker will be detected with
high probability while achieving throughput arbitrarily close to
optimal. Such properties reduce the incentive for the attacker to
attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In wireless ad hoc and sensor networks, paths between a
source and destination are usually multihop, and data packets
are relayed in several wireless hops from their source to their
destination. This multihop nature makes the wireless networks
subject to tampering attack: a compromised/misbehaving node
can easily ruin data communications along the paths it is on
by dropping or corrupting packets it should forward.
Watchdog mechanism proposed in [1] is a monitoring
method used for ad hoc and sensor networks, and it is the base
of many misbehavior detection algorithms and trust or repu-
tation systems. The basic idea of watchdog is that watchdog
node monitors whether its neighbor forwards the packets by
overhearing. If the packet is not forwarded within a certain
period or is forward but altered, the neighbor is regarded
as misbehaving in this transaction. When the misbehaving
rate surpasses certain threshold, the source is notified and
subsequent packets will be forwarded along other routes.
The main challenge for most watchdog mechanisms is
the unreliable wireless enviorment. Due to possible reasons
such as channel fading, collision with other transmission, or
interference, even when the source node and the attacker are
both within communication range, the watchdog may not be
able to overhear every transmission and therefore is unable to
determine whether there is an attack.
To mitigate the misbehavior of the malicious nodes, a
watchdog mechanism must achieve the following two goals:
(1) A malicious node should be detected with high probability
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if it attacks. (2) The throughput under the detection mechanism
should be comparable to the throughput without detection if
there is no attack. These two goals seem to have conflict in
interest. On one hand, to improve the probability of detection,
we need to introduce more redendancy. On the other hand,
better throughput requires redendancy to be reduced.
In this paper, we show that both goals can be achieved
simultaneously by introducing error detection block coding
to the watchdog mechanism. This scheme is computationally
simple, yet efficient. The watchdog only need to perform a
compare operation. And by choosing the encoder properly,
the probability of miss-detection can be made arbitrarily small
while the throughput approaches optimal, even in the case
when the attacker knows what encoder is being used and the
watchdog can only overhear a fraction of the packets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses related work. Section III proves any linear
operation is inefficient in misbehavior detection. Section IV
and V discribe and analyse our watchdog scheme with error
detection codes. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
To ensure the reliability of packet delivery, trust for ad
hoc and sensor networks has been investigated in a lot of
literatures. The foundation of such dynamic trust system is
the node behavior monitoring mechanism. The most frequently
used one is the watchdog mechanism proposed in [1] and its
variations.
The main idea of watchdog in [1] was overhearing. When
a node sends a packet to its neighbor, it also cached it locally.
Then the node listens to its neighbor’s communication. If the
neighbor does not forward the same packet to its next-hop
node within a short period, it is regarded as misbehaving.
By this way, a node can record the successful and failed
forwarding history of its next-hop.
On the basis of watchdog, various misbehavior judging and
handling mechanisms are proposed. [1] judges a node to be
misbehaving when failure tally exceeds a certain threshold and
it sends a packet backward to notify the source. Then the
source would choose a new route free of misbehaving node
with the aid of “pathrater”.
[2] proposes to measure the next-hop’s behavior with the
local evaluation record which is defined as a 2-tuple: packet
ratio and byte ratio, forwarded by the next-hop neighbor. Local
2Fig. 1. Single Flow. Arrows (in or out) connected to the same node interfere
with each other. The dash lines represent broadcast channels.
evaluation records are broadcast to all neighbors. The trust
level of a node is the combination of its local observation
and the broadcasted information. Trust level is inserted to
the RREQ. Route is selected in the similar way to AODV
[3]. Although many ad hoc trust or reputation systems [4],
[5] and [6] adopt different trust level calculation mechanism,
the basic processes are similar to [2], including monitoring,
broadcasting local observation, combing the direct and indirect
information into the final trust level.
Recently, the security issue in network coding systems has
drawn much attention. Due to the mixing nature of network
coding, such systems are subjects to a severe security threat,
known as a pollution attack, where attackers inject corrupted
packets into the network.
Several solutions to address pollution attacks in intra-flow
coding systems use special-crafted digital signatures [7], [8],
[9], [10] or hash functions [11], [12], which have homomor-
phic properties that allow intermediate nodes to verify the
integrity of combined packets. Non-cryptographic solutions
have also been proposed [13], [14]. [15] proposes two practical
schemes to address pollution attacks against network coding
in wireless mesh networks without requireing complex cryp-
tographic functions and incure little overhead.
Most of the existing network coding scheme relies on
random linear combination of data packets. And as we show
in Section III, any linear operation cannot eliminate miss-
detection even if all transmissions are reliable.
III. LIMITATION OF LINEAR CODING
In this section, we point out the limitation for linear coding
in attack detection and show the advantage of non-linear
coding. Let’s consider the following example as in Fig.1. There
are 4 nodes in this case: the source node S, destination node
D, attacker A, and the watchdog node W. Transmissions are
represented by arrows. Arrows (in or out) connected to the
same node interfere with each other and cannot be schedule
simultaneously. The dash lines represent broadcast channels.
Each packet consists of n symbols from the finite fiele Fq.
When S (A) sends a packets, it will be received by A and
W (D and W). S wants to transmit data packets to D through
A. We want any tampering by A to be detected by D. We
assume all links are reliable, have the same transmission rate
1 symbol per unit time. We also assume an optimal centralized
schedule is enforced. Under such assuptions, the watchdog W
is able to monitor every packet and send m checking symbols
to D. The m checking symbols is a funtion of p and p′,
vector representation of the original packet sent by S and the
corresponding copy forwarded by A: w = F (p, p′). Under
such assumptions the throughput is
T =
n
2n+m
(symbols/unit time). (1)
For the case of linear coding, we assume F satisfies the
following properties:
F (0, 0) = 0 (2)
F (a, b) + F (c, d) = F (a+ c, b+ d) (3)
F (γa, 0) = γF (a, 0) (4)
F (0, γa) = γF (0, a). (5)
Node D will miss an attacked packet if F (p′, p′) = w. Denote
p′ = p+ e,
F (p′, p′) = F (p, p′) (6)
⇔ F (p+ e, p+ e) = F (p, p+ e) (7)
⇔ F (p, p) + F (e, e) = F (p, p) + F (0, e) (8)
⇔ F (e, e) = F (0, e) (9)
⇔ F (e, 0) = 0. (10)
It is easy to show that F (e, 0) is a linear function of e and
can be expressed by a m× n matrix M in the finite field Fq,
and
F (e, 0) = Me. (11)
If A chooses e from the null space of M, Null(M), F (e, 0)
will be 0 and D will consider the packet safe. Suppose A has
no knowledge of F , the best it can do is to pick a random e.
Then the probability of miss an attack equals to the probability
of picking e from the qRank(Null(M)) − 1 non-zero vectors of
Null(M) out of qn − 1 non-zero vectors in the n dimension
space. Since n − m ≤ Rank(Null(M)) ≤ n, we have the
following bounds of the probability of miss-detection for any
linear coding scheme
qn−m − 1
2n − 1
≤ Pmiss ≤
qn − 1
2n − 1
⇔
qn−m − 1
qn − 1
≤ Pmiss ≤ 1. (12)
So to achieve a target probability of miss-detection θ, W
has to send at least m ≥ ⌈− log2 θ⌉ checking symbols to
D for every packet. On other hand, if we allow F to be
nonlinear, only one symbol is enough to eliminate miss-
detection completely. This can be easily done by setting
F (p, p′) = 1{p=p′}, which equals to 1 if p = p′ and 0
otherwise.
Here we want to point out the same result also applies to
linear network coding. The proof is similar by considering p
as a generation of n coded packets and the watchdog sends m
linear conbinations of the packets it overhears to the receiver
for verification.
3IV. SINGLE FLOW CASE
Here we consider the same example in Section III. The
watchdog W will compare packets that it overhears from both
S and A, and will report an attack if they do not match. But
we assume the watchdog W can detect tampering by A with
probability q. In this case, W may not always be able to detect
an attack. To enhance security, S encodes every k packets into
a block of n coded packets with a (n,k) error detection code.
We further assume the attacker knows what encoder is being
used but does not know which packets W is able to overhear.
We assume MDS (maximum distance separable) codes are
being used. With a (n,k) MDS code, an attack will always be
detected as long as no more than n−k packets are altered. As
a result, A has to alter at least n− k+1 packets in a block in
order to avoid being detected by the decoder. And since the
more packets A attacks the easier it will be caught by W, it is
of A’s interest to just attack the minimum number of packets
per block: n− k + 1. In this case, it is easy to show that the
probobility of A not being caught is
Pmiss(n, k, q) = (1 − q)
n−k+1. (13)
We are interested in the highest coding rates we can achieve
such that A has no incentive to attack. We construct a (n,k)
encoder such that
k = n+ 1−
f(n, q)
q
(14)
From Eq.13 we have
Pmiss(n, k, q)≤ e
−q(n−k+1)
= e−f(n,q) (15)
We can then choose the function f(n, q) appropriately so that
we can make Pmiss arbitrarily small. For example, by making
f(n, q) = β lnn for any positive constant β, we have
Pmiss(n, k, q)≤ e
−β lnn
= n−β (16)
So we can reduce the incentive for A to attack by making the
block longer. And the coding rate becomes
R=
k
n
=
n+ 1− β lnn
q
n
= 1 +
1
n
−
β
q
lnn
n
(17)
Since the delay to verify a block equals to the time it takes
to transmit n packets in the block, tradeoff between probability
of miss-detection and n we plot in Figure 2 and Figure 3 is
also the tradeoff between miss-detection and delay. We assume
that for the n plotted in the figures, a suitable MDS (n,k) code
exists for the block. We can see that by integrating a watchdog
and error detection coding, we can reduce the incentive for the
attacker to attack by allowing longer delay.
Notice that by making n large, the coding/decoding com-
plexity increases. In the case complexity is a concern, the
source can scramble coded packets of multiple (n, k) encoded
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Fig. 2. Miss detection probability v.s. observe probability in the single flow
example.
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Fig. 3. Miss detection probability with k = n + 1 − β lnn
q
in the single
flow example.
blocks and transmit these packets in a random order. By doing
so, the attacker will have to corrupt more packets in order to
destroy a particular block, which makes it easier to be detected
by the watchdog.
V. TWO FLOWS CASE
In the previous section, we assume the watchdog W can
only compare a packet with probability q. Possible reasons
for making this assuption are: a watchdong node may be
intentionally turned off occasionally in order to save power,
or interference from other nodes in the network makes the
watchdog can observe only a fraction of the packets. In this
section, we will look into the latter case. Since the level
of intereference is highly correlated to the traffic load in
the system, we will mainly focus on the trade-off between
throughput and security.
4Fig. 4. Two Flows
Consider the following example. There are two flows in
the system: S1-A-D1 and S2-B-D2. These flows are far
away from each other so there is no inter-flow interference.
But the watchdog W is sitting between the flows and can
overhear transmissions on all the four links. So even though a
transmission is successful along its path, it may collide with
transmissions along the other flow at W. Suppose A is the
attacker, we want to know the probability q in this case.
For traffic pattern, we assume a slotted aloha with access
probability α. To simplify the analysis, we further assume a
node will access the channel by transmitting dummy packets
when it has no data packet to send. Under these assumptions,
we can compute the throughput and observe probability as
T = α(1− α), (18)
q = (1− α)5. (19)
The exponent in Eq.19 is 5 because given that the transmission
from S1 to A is successful, W can overhear it if neither S2 nor
B transmit which occurs with probability (1−α)2. To compare
this packet, W should overhear the transmission from A to D1
too, which happens with probability (1 − α)3 for S1, S2 and
B to remain siilent.
Similar to the one-flow example, we can make Pmiss
arbitrarily small by choosing
k = n+ 1−
β lnn
(1− α)5
. (20)
And the effective throughput is
TE = TR
= α(1 − α)(1 +
1
n
)−
αβ lnn
(1 − α)4n
. (21)
In Figure 5 and Figure 6 we plot the miss-detection proba-
bility and effective throughput when the error detection code
is chosen according to Eq. 20. We only plot the result for
α ≤ 0.5 because further increasing α will only reduce the
throughput. We can see from Figure 5 the probability of miss-
detection increases as the α increases and converges to roughly
n−β . Since the higher α is, the fewer packets the watchdog
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Fig. 5. Miss detection probability v.s. channel access probability with k =
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in the two flows example. Where the curves stop means no
code is available.
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Fig. 6. Effective throughput v.s. channel access probability k = n + 1 −
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in the two flows example. Where the curves stop means no code is
available.
can observe, the source has to sacrify coding rate in order
to maintain a certain probability of missing an attack as α
increases. As it is shown in Figure 6, as α increases, the
effective throughput increases up to a certain level then drops
to zero as α gets larger.
We show the performance of some (2m − 1, 2m −m − 1)
Hamming codes in Figure 7 and Figure 8. In the case we can-
not adapt the encoder to channel access probability, although
there is no guarantee for miss-detection probability, a longer
code always performs better in terms of both miss-detection
probability and effective throughput. But such improvement
comes with the cost of additional delay.
VI. DISCUSSION
In the previous sections, we have studied the case when the
watchdog node is trustworthy. But in reality, it is also possible
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Fig. 7. Miss detection probability v.s. channel access probability for some
Hamming codes.
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Channel access probability α
Ef
fe
ct
ive
 th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 
 
(7,4)
(31,26)
(127,120)
(511,502)
Fig. 8. Effective throughput v.s. channel access probability for some
Hamming codes.
that the watchdog misbehaves. We admit that our scheme may
fail detecting an attack both the watchdog and the forwarder
can be malicious. In this case the relay node can alter the
packets as much as possible without being detected as long as
the faulty watchdog never declares an attack. However, in the
case of single failure (at most one of the two nodes - forward
or watchdog - is faulty), if the watchdog is faulty, the only
way for it to attack the system is to accuse the relay node of
attacking; and if the watchdog is well-behaving, it will declare
an attack if and only if the relay node alters the packets. So
under the assumption of single failure, we can be sure that
either the watchdog or the relay is malicious. However, our
scheme still cannot determine which node is misbehaving. To
break the tie, the relay may have to be monitored by more
than one watchdog and have a higher connectivity requirement.
This is one of the potential directions, and we are currently
working on it.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we study the problem of misbehavior detection
in wireless networks. We first show that even if a watchdog
can overhear all packet transmissions of a flow, any linear
operation of the overheard packets can not eliminate miss-
detection and is inefficient in terms of bandwidth. We propose
a lightweigh misbehavior detection scheme which integrates
the idea of watchdogs and error detection coding. We show
that even if the watchdog can only observe a fraction of
packets, by choosing the encoder properly, an attacker will
be detected with high probability while achieving throughput
arbitrarily close to optimal.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Marti, T. J. Giuli, K. Lai, and M. Baker, “Mitigating routing
misbehavior in mobile ad hoc networks,” in MobiCom ’00: Proceedings
of the 6th annual international conference on Mobile computing and
networking. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2000, pp. 255–265.
[2] T. Ghosh, N. Pissinou, and K. Makki, “Towards designing a trusted
routing solution in mobile ad hoc networks,” Mob. Netw. Appl., vol. 10,
no. 6, pp. 985–995, 2005.
[3] C. Perkins and E. Royer, “Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing,”
Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, 1999. Proceedings. WM-
CSA ’99. Second IEEE Workshop on, pp. 90–100, Feb 1999.
[4] S. Buchegger and J.-Y. Le Boudec, “Performance analysis of the
confidant protocol,” in MobiHoc ’02: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM
international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing.
New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2002, pp. 226–236.
[5] C. Zouridaki, B. L. Mark, M. Hejmo, and R. K. Thomas, “A quanti-
tative trust establishment framework for reliable data packet delivery
in manets,” in SASN ’05: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on
Security of ad hoc and sensor networks. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2005, pp. 1–10.
[6] S. Ganeriwal and M. B. Srivastava, “Reputation-based framework for
high integrity sensor networks,” in SASN ’04: Proceedings of the 2nd
ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2004, pp. 66–77.
[7] D. C. Kamal, D. Charles, K. Jain, and K. Lauter, “Signatures for
network coding,” in In Proceedings of the fortieth annual Conference
on Information Sciences and Systems, 2006.
[8] Z. Yu, Y. Wei, B. Ramkumar, and Y. Guan, “An efficient signature-
based scheme for securing network coding against pollution attacks,”
INFOCOM 2008. The 27th Conference on Computer Communications.
IEEE, pp. 1409–1417, April 2008.
[9] F. Zhao, T. Kalker, M. Mdard, and K. J. Han, “Signatures for content
distribution with network coding,” in In Proc. of International Sympo-
sium on Information Theory (ISIT, 2007.
[10] Q. Li, D.-M. Chiu, and J. Lui, “On the practical and security issues of
batch content distribution via network coding,” Network Protocols, 2006.
ICNP ’06. Proceedings of the 2006 14th IEEE International Conference
on, pp. 158–167, Nov. 2006.
[11] M. N. Krohn, “On-the-fly verification of rateless erasure codes for
efficient content distribution,” in In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, 2004, pp. 226–240.
[12] C. Gkantsidis and P. Rodriguez Rodriguez, “Cooperative security for
network coding file distribution,” INFOCOM 2006. 25th IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Computer Communications. Proceedings, pp.
1–13, April 2006.
[13] T. Ho, B. Leong, R. Koetter, M. Mdard, M. Effros, and D. Karger,
“Byzantine modification detection in multicast networks using random-
ized network coding,” 2004.
[14] S. Jaggi, M. Langberg, S. Katti, T. Ho, D. Katabi, and M. Medard,
“Resilient network coding in the presence of byzantine adversaries,”
INFOCOM 2007. 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer
Communications. IEEE, pp. 616–624, May 2007.
[15] J. Dong, R. Curtmola, and C. Nita-Rotaru, “Practical defenses against
pollution attacks in intra-flow network coding for wireless mesh net-
works,” in WiSec ’09: Proceedings of the second ACM conference on
Wireless network security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009, pp.
111–122.
